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Summary 
Reforms of EU Common Fisheries Policy will make fundamental changes to European fisheries 
management, including a discard ban with catch quotas for regulated species and management to 
achieve MSY. We evaluate the impact of these changes on revenue of North Sea demersal finfish fleets 
and fish stocks. With no change in behaviour, revenue is reduced by a mean of 31% compared to 
current management in the first year, but partly recovers by year 3, as fishing mortality is reduced and 
stocks increase.  There are large differences in revenue changes between fleets, varying from -99% to 
+36%, depending on whether the stock with the most limiting catch quota is a primary target and the 
rate at which it is caught relative to other stocks. Impacts will be greatest if catch quotas are set at 
current landings quotas, and reduce with an uplift to reflect current discarding levels. Large 
reductions in revenue create a strong incentive to avoid catching the limiting species, particularly if it 
is not a primary target. Selectivity changes that avoid 30% cod catch reduced the economic impact for 
some fleets in moving to catch quotas. Increased flexibility will therefore be important in maintaining 
the profitability of the fisheries. 
Introduction 
The reform of the European Union’s (EU) Common Fisheries Policy (CFP; European Union, 2013) 
introduces a discard ban for regulated species combined with catch quotas.  Starting from 2015 total 
catches rather than just landings will count against quota and there is a legally binding requirement to 
manage fisheries in a way that achieves maximum sustainable yield (MSY) by 2020. Full 
documentation of catches allows part of the quota currently set aside to account for discards to be 
added to landing quotas, but once the quota is exhausted fishers must halt any activities that risk the 
capture of the regulated species. Reducing unwanted catches in mixed fisheries will be required if 
fishers are to maximise income from available quota. 
Pilot schemes have shown catch quotas create strong economic incentives for a change in fishing 
behaviour, such as avoidance of sub-legally sized fish and reduced targeting of quota species (Condie 
et al 2014). The strength of incentive may depend on how quota is distributed and current size and 
species composition of catches, so how catch quotas are implemented plays a significant role in 
determining any potential changes in fishing behaviour (Condie et al., 2014). Using Fcube (Fleet and 
Fisheries Forecast) (Ulrich et al., 2011) we evaluate the potential impact on stocks and fleets of different 
implementation protocols in the multi-stock, multi-fleet fishery of the North Sea and identify 
management options that would produce the strongest incentives for more selective fishing. 
Materials and Methods 
Using Fcube we estimated the potential level of effort that could be exerted by fleets in future years, 
based on fishing opportunities, catchability and relative effort share. The model is parameterised on 
data from the ICES WGMIXFISH group and Harvest Control Rules consistent with current 
management plans, or FMSY and fishing stops for a fleet when the first quota is reached.  Potential 
changes in the catches of six stocks from the North Sea demersal fisheries are forecast with different 
catch quota implementation protocols are compared to the current single-species quota management. 
Protocols include i) catch quotas set in line with existing TACs (or total allowable landings, TALs); ii) 
in line with a 30% increase in existing TALs, or increased to account for iii) 75% or iv) 100% of 
discards. The potential effect of changes in fishers behaviour is simulated by fleets catching i) no under 
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Minimum Landing Size (MLS) fish, ii) no under MLS cod, and iii) a 30% reduction in cod catchability.  
Revenue generated from catches is estimated based on data collated by the ICES WGMIXFISH group 
and the STECF (Jardim et al, 2013). Catch under the legal MLS was estimated by species, nation and 
métier using STECF and survey data. 
Results and Discussion 
Results indicate that were catch quotas implemented 
without any behavioural change revenue from the six 
stocks modelled will reduce by a mean 31% in 2014, 
25% in 2015 and 15% in 2016 (across all fleets, 
protocols) compared to current management.  This is 
due to an under-utilisation of quotas other than cod 
(with cod being the choke stock for most fleets), with 
revenue increasing each year due to a rapidly 
increasing cod stock allowing more quota to be fished 
in future years. A three way analysis of variance shows 
that the effects of fleet (F=1479, p<0, df=34), protocol 
(F=1109, p<0, df=3) and year (F=829, p<0, df=2) 
explained 86% of the variance in the results, 
suggesting that the protocol and characteristics of the 
fleet are key factors determining revenue change 
during the transition to catch quotas.  Unsurprisingly, 
the larger the proportion of catch previously discarded 
that is allocated to the fleets, the lesser the impact on 
reductions in revenue (Figure 1(a)), but impact fleets 
varied significantly (Figure 1(b) – from -99% to +36%).  
The largest reductions in revenue were for fleets that 
had to forego their target stock quota and the limiting 
stock was only a small proportion of revenue; fleets 
limited by their target stock could increase revenue 
from being able to land previously discarded >MLS 
fish.  Selectivity improvements which avoid catching 
cod (Figure 1(c)) had a positive impact on revenue, 
indicating this will be the key challenge the fisheries 
face.  Extending the work in Condie et al (2014) we 
looked at the implementation of the landings 
obligation across the multi-stock multi-fleet North Sea 
demersal fisheries.  It shows the potential stock (and 
longer term fishery) benefits from reduced fishing 
mortalities moving to catch quotas, but highlights a varied economic impact on fleets in the transition; 
efforts should focus on ensuring maximum flexibility for fleets during this period, particularly to 
avoid non-target quota species becoming economic choke stocks in the fisheries. 
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Figure 1. % change in the marginal mean of 
revenue from baseline across all factors, except 
year and; (a) implementation protocol, (b) fleets, 
(c) simulated behavioural change (lines indicate 
SE±1.96) 
